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Challenges in Keeping the Balance between the Member-State 
Competencies and Rules of the EU Single Market
Natalia BERUASHVILI*  
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions and different types of discriminations in order to determine the ways 
national rules hindering interstate trade and movement, are in conflict with Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) provisions. Particular attention would be paid on intersection of the EU and Member States competencies as well as 
their division by the means of negative integration inevitably affecting regulatory powers of the Member States. Furthermore, 
we will study how Court using derogations to the free movement, endeavours to maintain the balance between exercising state 
competencies, mostly deriving from the State sovereignty and implementation of the EU Legislation necessary for effective 
functioning of the single market.
Keywords: derogations, EU Law, EU, reverse discrimination, single market.  
Introduction
Foundations for common market were laid down by the 
Rome Treaty. Treaty of the Rome was considered as the 
“constitution of the European Community from which all ot-
her Community acts derive their formal validity and binding 
force” (Sideek Mohamed, 1999, p.32). The core idea and 
“the aim and the task of the Community Law is the 
integration of the national economies by means of the inter-
nal market and the Economic and Monetary Uni-
on” (Wolfgang Schon, 2000, p.90) The Common Market 
and the Monetary and the Economic Union establish the 
central political-economic instruments that are targeted to 
fulfil above-mentioned aims of the market integration (Wolf-
gang Schon, 2000, p.90).
The idea of the common market provided for trade area 
free from any tariffs or quotas between participating states, 
so that each member state produce basically goods in which 
it has comparative economic advantage. In the relation-
ship with the third countries, states kept their tariffs varying 
from country to country, stimulating third countries to import 
through the state with the lowest customs tariff. This created 
trade barriers and distortions of competition. The problem 
was solved by establishing customs union introducing single 
customs tariffs towards third countries. (Paul Craig, 2002, 
p.2). Consequently, the concept of a customs union was
to provide third country with the equal customs and com-
mercial treatment, when they enter the EU as well as goods 
imported from the third countries and goods produced in the 
EU will freely move from one state to the other without tariffs, 
restriction or discrimination (Green, Hartley, Usher, 1991, 
p.3). Besides customs union, common market envisaged
free movement of labor, goods, capital, establishment and 
services supported by relevant economic rationale. (Paul 
Craig, 2002, p.2).
Common market alongside negative integration by 
eliminating customs tariffs required positive integration by 
harmonization of different rules assisting free trade. On the 
same footing, measures prohibiting state aids were adopted 
in order to support level playing field. However, it was recog-
nized that there would be areas where state regulation will 
continue to exist (Paul Craig, 2002, p.2). 
It was also emphasized that one of the core attributes 
of the market integration is realization of the fundamental 
freedoms. The fundamental freedoms are recognized as di-
rectly effective prohibitions of the discriminations and res-
trictions (Wolfgang Schon, 2000, p.91). Are fundamental 
freedoms absolute? 
Fundamental freedoms can be hampered by the limita-
tion or breach of the right to freely cross the borders of the 
Member States or discriminate on grounds of nationality or 
origin (Paul Bater, 2000, p.8). First, we will look at indistinctly 
applicable restrictions1  concerning free movement of goods 
and then we will discuss the reflection of these EU rules in 
terms of guaranteeing other fundamental freedoms bearing 
in mind peculiarities of each freedom. This will be followed 
by the examination of the discriminatory measures including 
reverse discrimination in most cases subject to the internal 
regulation. Finally, I will conduct a brief study on justification 
grounds of the national regulations breaching the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provisions 
on free movement.
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Non-Discriminatory Obstacles on Free Movement and Trade
According to the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)) 
quantitative restrictions and all measures that have 
equivalent effect are prohibited. Quantitative restrictions 
were broadly defined in the Geddo2  case as the “measures 
which amount to a total or partial restraint of, according to 
circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit”. Snell 
claims that quantitative restrictions were not a major con-
cern of the EU since it is relatively easy to detect and con-
trol them whereas measures having equivalent effect are 
more hardly definable and detectable (Jukka Snell, 2002, 
p.49). Quantitative restrictions as well as measures having
equivalent effect were interpreted in Directive 70/503 . This 
Directive prohibits distinctly applicable measures ham-
pering imports as well as equally applicable to domestic 
and imported products measures having restrictive effect 
on the free movement of goods and exceeding effects on 
the intrinsic to trade, namely where the restrictive effects 
are out of proportion to their purpose or where the same 
objective can be fulfilled by other means having less 
hindrance effect to trade (Green, Hartley, Usher, 1991, 
p.63). Measures having equivalent effect were further
defined by the case law in Dassonville4  as “all trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions”5. In addition, it should 
be emphasized that according to notion derived from the 
definition, discriminatory intent is not required (Craig P., De 
Burca G.,2002, p.617). Later, in Cassis de Dijon6  Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) recog-nized that Article 34 of 
the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC) could protect free movement 
of goods from restrictions which are not of discriminatory 
character (Craig P., De Burca G., 2002, p.617).
In Cassis de Dijon Court tried to solve the problem of 
disparity between national rules causing obstacle to the es-
tablishment of the common market. In fact disparity 
between the rules of different states although being equally 
applicable to imports and domestic products imposed dual 
burden on imported products since they have to comply 
with rules of states of import and origin at the same time. 
This forms obstacles to trade. In substance the rules of the 
state of import can be considered as discriminatory. 
Dassonville formula as a solution in this case refers to cre-
ation of principle of mutual recognition by one Member 
State lawfully produced and marketed goods in another 
Member State (Jukka Snell, 2002, pp 55-56). However, 
state regulation together with the obstacles to trade can be 
accepted, only if such rules are 
justified by the mandatory requirements deriving from gener-
al interest (Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, pp.638-639). It could 
be argued that Cassis de Dijon initiated gradual reduction of 
the regulatory powers of the Member States concerning free 
movement of goods and other freedoms as consequence of 
deregulatory harmonization. Thus, “the balance appeared to 
have been struck between the demands of the single 
market and the legitimate interests of Member States” (J. 
Steiner,1992, p.753).
Subsequent case law showed practical difficulties con-
cerning utilization of the Dassonville principle, in particular, 
court must decide whether the measure is covered by Das-
sonville and hence would recognize it as prima-facie viola-
tion of the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC)   
(Steiner J., 1992, p.754). Steiner particularly underlines the 
problem of interpretation of “hindrance” composing one of 
the core elements of Dassonville formula (Steiner J.,1992, 
p.753). Further, he explains that two situations should ap-
pear in which hindrance will occur: “Firstly, where the meas-
ure in question, although indistinctly applicable, operates to 
the advantage of the domestic product, usually by imposing 
some detriment on the importer, by making the importation 
of competing goods more difficult or burdensome or costly 
than the disposal of the comparable domestic product, or 
simply impossible. Such will be the case, when conditions 
are imposed, for example in respect of the quality or content 
or presentation or documentation which are different from 
or additional to those imposed in the state of manu-
facture” (Steiner J., 1992, p.754). Such measures do dimi-
nish total volume of trade (Jukka Snell, 2002, p.66). Snell 
believes that hindrance caused by equal burden rules7  can 
be eliminated only by abolishing those rules. He does not 
concede even harmonization as a remedy (Jukka Snell, 
2002, p.66). In addition he underlines that they “might be 
covered by the economic freedoms reading, but certainly 
not by the anti-protectionism model” (Jukka Snell, 2002, 
p.66). In Cinetheque8  French Law was prohibiting the sale
and renting videos within the year of their cinematographic 
release. The purpose of this law was to encourage people 
to go to the cinema and hence protect cinematographic 
business from losses. Advocate General Slynn suggested 
that this measure was not falling within the scope of the 
Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC): Where a 
national measure is not specifically directed at imports, 
does not discriminate against imports, does not make it any 
more difficult for an importer to sell his products than it is 
for a domestic producer, and gives no protection to 
domestic producers, than in my view, prima facie, the 
measure does not fall within Article 36 of the TFEU (ex. 
Article 30 TEC)9.
2 Case 2/73, Geddo v.Ente Nazionale Risi [1973] ECR 865) 
3 Directive 70/50, [1970] OJ L13/29 Articles 2,3
4 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837
5 Dassonville, paragraph 5
6 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v.Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649
7 “Equal Burden Rules” are those rules applying to all goods, irrespective of origin, which regulate trade in some manner.
8 Case 60.61/84  Cinetheque SA v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 2605
9 Case 60.61/84  Cinetheque SA v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 2611
Challenges in Keeping the Balance between the Member-State Competencies and Rules of the EU Single Market
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878; Volume 4, Issue 1, 2015
7
However, court disagreed with opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral and took view that it was prima facie measure breaching 
Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC). For this purpose 
it required and then scrutinized the justification of the French 
Government. 
According to Stainer Cinetheque10 exemplified that 
“where the measure does not necessarily confer an advan-
tage on the domestic product or disadvantage imports but 
nevertheless undermines the single market principle, as 
occurs for example, when industrial property rights or other 
rules are invoked perhaps for the quite legitimate purposes, 
to deny, or severely restrict marketing opportunities or ad-
vantages for the imported product in the state of the import 
or where the consumer prejudices, based on the national 
origin of goods, are encouraged or reinforced” (Steiner J., 
1992, p.755). Finally, this decision considered equal burden 
rules within the scope of the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Ar-
ticle 28 TEC)  and added to the list of the mandatory re-
quirements another justification ground aimed to protect or 
enhance artistic works (Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, p.644).
The same issue of whether equal burden rules fall with-
in the scope of Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC) 
was faced by the ECJ in Sunday Trading cases. Torfaen11 
is a typical example of Sunday trading cases. In this case 
B&Q was prosecuted for the violation of the Shops Act 1950, 
because of trading on Sundays. B&Q argued that these 
laws constituted the measure equivalent to the quantitative 
restrictions in violation of the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex 
Article 28 TEC). As a result of these laws, the total volume 
of the sales was reduced. Rule in question was pure equal-
burden measure, not constituting any prohibition on imports 
(Jukka Snell, 2002, p.66). Court relying on Cinetheque, 
decided that trading prohibition prima facie was covered by 
the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC). 
The rule was caught by the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. 
Article 28 TEC), however, it was justified from the perspec-
tive of the EU Law and was considered as proportionate 
(Craig P., De Burca G., 2002, p.645).This case is significant 
from the perspective of the relationship between regulatory 
competence of the Member States and the EU since regula-
tory powers of the Member States seemed to be diminished. 
Snell concerning this approach of the Court underlines: “A 
large number of national measures fell to be inspected by 
the Court, a central institution applying central law, and 
were brought within the scope of approximation provisions. 
Regulatory competition was potentially stifled as national 
laws could be struck down or harmonized, instead of being 
left to compete against each other” (Jukka Snell, 2002, 
p.67).
It is obvious now that the ECJ had thought concerning 
the propriety of strategy for dealing with the equal burden 
rules (Craig P., De Burca G., 2002, p.645). The Keck12  can 
be considered as a sign of altering approach of the ECJ 
with respect to the equal burden rules (Craig P., De Burca 
G.,2002, p.646) by excluding so called ‘selling arrange-
ments rules’ from the scope of the Article 34 of the TFEU 
(ex. Article 28 TEC). However, the later case law established 
a condition to this rule as ‘selling arrangements’ would fall 
outside the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC) if they 
don’t impede market access for imported products in gen-
eral or with more degree of hindrance for imported goods 
rather than domestic products (Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, 
p.656). As we already mentioned general prohibition of non-
discriminatory restrictions may affect regulatory powers of 
the Members States, imposing on the market participants, 
duty to comply with the national rules. This could be con-
sidered by the Court as a restriction to cross border free 
movement. However, the “restriction” other than in case of 
goods was not defined (Michael Tison, 1998, p.215). Tison 
submitted that broad Dassonville-formula was used by the 
Court when applying it to the other fundamental freedoms. 
Consequently, further he concludes that restriction can be 
defined as “all measures which directly or indirectly, actu-
ally or potentially affect cross border free movement will be 
caught by the prohibition” bearing in mind particular objec-
tives of each freedom (Michael Tison, 1998, p.215). 
With the respect of the services, the question is also, 
whether non-discriminatory measures are falling within the 
scope of Treaty provisions. In cases Sager13 and Schindler14 
Court concluded that non-discriminatory measures with the 
respect of the freedom of the services fall within the scope 
of the Article 56 of the TFEU (ex. Article 49 TEC) and must 
be justified on the grounds of public interest (Chris Hilson, 
1999, p.451). In Sager Court indicated that even restrictions 
equally applying to both resident and non-resident service 
providers may be inconsistent with the Article 56 of the TFEU 
(ex. Article 49 TEC), whenever such restrictions prohibit or 
otherwise impede service activities in another Member State 
and hence should be justified by imperative grounds of the 
general interest. In Schindler, the Court asserted the cove-
rage by the Article 56 of the TFEU (ex. Article 49 TEC) of 
the non-discriminatory rules, if they prevent provision of 
service, whereas the person legally carries out the similar 
economic activity in the State of establishment (Luigi 
Daniele, 1997, pp.192-193). Consequently, non-discrimi-
natory national rules are challenged, if they prevent a 
person from exercising his/her right (Paul Bater, 2000, 
p.11). The approach of the Court, with the respect of the
non-discriminatory measures restricting freedoms of servi-
ces, is similar to the freedom of goods, namely Cassis de 
Dijon rule, where such kind of legislation is considered to 
be under the relevant Articles prohibiting restrictions (Luigi 
Daniele, 1997, p.196). However, comparing restrictions of 
free movement of the goods and the services, “it could be 
argued the free movement of the goods was concerned 
with the economic freedom, while the provisions of services 
targeted only protectionism” (Jukka Snell, 2002, p.52). 
10 Case 60.61/84  Cinetheque SA v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais [1985] ECR 2605, paragraphs 21,22
11 C- 145/88, Torfaen BC v. B&Q plc [1989] ECR 3851 
12 Cases C-267 and 268/91, Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097
13 Case C-76/90 Sager v. Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221
14 Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039
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As for freedom of establishment and free movement of 
the workers based on Sodemare15  and Bosman16  respec-
tively, there is no doubt that non-discriminatory measures 
are falling within the scope of Treaty Articles (Article 49 of 
the TFEU (ex. Article 43 TEC) and Article 45 of the TFEU 
(ex. Article 39 TEC). In Bosman Court held that “such a 
rule17  hinders the free movement of football players wis-
hing to carry out their activity in a different Member State, 
since they are prevented or, at least, dissuaded from leaving 
the team by which they are employed” (Luigi Daniele, 1997, 
p.195).
Summarizing the case law we can conclude that ECJ 
takes broad view in determining what can be considered as 
a restriction breaching relevant provisions of the Treaty on 
free movement. It could be argued that such wide interpre-
tation leads to centralization of the EU. However, centrali-
zation prevents competition between the legal systems and 
hence progress making learning processes. Consequently, 
decentralized approach may be more beneficial for the EU 
(Jukka Snell, 2002, p.70). Daniele echoes this view with 
respect of free movement of persons. He believes that so 
called “global approach” can be relevant only to goods and 
services other than persons arguing that case law utilizing 
this approach to persons does not seem to be solid (Luigi 
Daniele,1997, p.195). Hilson also shares this position and 
suggests applying ‘selling arrangements’ to workers and 
establishment indicating that single state rule can be true 
for workers and establishment (Chris Hilson,1999, p.451). 
Further he emphasizes that “if the single market suggests 
that in certain cases, the Court should closely scrutinize 
non-discriminatory measures, then issues of subsidiarity 
and national regulatory autonomy provide a possible reason 
for keeping court out” (Chris Hilson,1999, p.457). 
Discrimination on the Grounds of Nationality or Origin
We can find harsher attitude of the Court concerning the dis-
criminatory and protectionist measures. Craig and de Burca 
explain: “If a polity decides to embrace a single-market, then 
discriminatory or protectionist measures will be at the top 
of the list of those to be caught, since they are directly op-
posed to the single market ideal” (Craig P., De Burca G., 
2002, p.625). It is notable that Craig and de Burca consider 
equally dangerous and subject to prohibition both discrimi-
natory and protectionist measures. Thus, discriminatory (but 
not protective) and protective (but not discriminatory) also 
should be tackled by the TFEU. The latter was examined 
above when we discussed indistinctly applicable measures 
hindering free movement. As for discriminatory but not pro-
tective measure, if “the Court thinks it (discriminatory meas-
ure) was intended to serve another justifiable aim under the 
Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC),  (or its equiva-
lent with the other freedoms), then the discriminatory intent 
alone will not lead to the measure being found in breach” 
(Chris Hilson,1999, p.451). Consequently, Hilson concludes 
that the discriminatory rules should have protectionist inten-
tion in order to be caught by the relevant Treaty provisions 
(Chris Hilson,1999, p.451).
The Treaty explicitly prohibits any kind of discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality (Article 18 of the TFEU (ex. 
Article 12 TEC)). Furthermore, although, the wording of the 
Articles on free movement of goods, workers, establishment 
and services (except Article 45 on workers18) do not refer 
particularly to discrimination, ECJ tended to treat those Ar-
ticles as prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality or origin and even non-discriminatory measures 
(Chris Hilson,1999, pp.445-446), which were discussed 
above. Moreover, Court insisted that prohibition of 
discrimination based on nationality covers not only direct 
discrimination, but its indirect forms as well, in particular 
while applying other criteria of differentiation may amount 
to covert discrimination (Siofra O’Leary, 1999, pp.399-400). 
Among four freedoms goods are considered as a paradigm 
of discriminatory measures’ treatment (Chris Hilson, 1999, 
p.446). The typical example of applying discriminatory rules
for goods by the State is import or export restrictions. In 
case of import, the Article 34 of the TFEU (ex. Article 28 
TEC), can bite, if national rule treats more favorably do-
mestic product than imports. In Rewe19  for example, phyto-
sanitary inspections were required for the import of plants, 
while no similar examination was made to domestic 
products. This measure was considered discriminatory and 
caught by the prohibition provisions. The same approach is 
used concerning discriminatory export rules. In Bouhelier20  
quality examination was required on watches for export 
and not on those to be sold on the domestic market (Craig 
P., De Burca G., 2002, p.618). However, there is a diffe-
rence between the import and export restrictions. 
According to Dassonville, judgement Court can tackle ac-
tual discrimination against imports, as well as restrictions 
hampering trade not originating in discrimination, while in 
case of export, without discriminatory aim, restrictive me-
asures will not fall within the scope of the Article 34 of the 
TFEU (ex. Article 28 TEC). This was concluded based on 
Groenveld 21  judgment (Geert Van Calster, 2000, p.336). 
15 Case C-70/95 Sodemare v. regione Lombardia [1997] ECR I-3395 (In this case Italian legislation was restricting provision of old-people’ 
homes to non-profit organizations).
16 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-5040
17 In this case Belgian law required new club purchasing football player to pay first premium to the former club in order to compensate train-
ing given to that footballer.
18 Article 39 of the EC Treaty prohibits discrimination based on nationality.
19 Case 4/75, Rewe-Zentralfinanz v.Landwirtschaftskammer [1975] ECR 843
20 Case 53/76, Procureur de la Republique Besancon v.Bouhelier [1977] ECR 197
21 Case 15/79, PB Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, [1979] ECR 3409
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Discrimination against imports of the goods might oc-
cur in different ways. One of the clearest examples is case 
Commission v. Ireland22 where State supports promotion of 
the sale of domestic comparing to imported goods23. Other 
forms of the discrimination are, when Member State protects 
domestic products by imposing rules on origin marking on 
certain goods  or rules making import difficult to enter market 
or costly by imposing additional administrative procedures 
such as tests24  or by price-fixing regulations rendering dif-
ficulties for importers to supply to the market their goods on 
the territory of the State of import (Craig P., De Burca G., 
2002, pp.618-624). 
The similar approach is used the with respect of the free 
movement of the services and persons, such that any na-
tional rule constituting direct or indirect discrimination based 
on nationality falls within the scope of the TFEU provisions 
and can be justified by the Member State only on the basis 
of exceptions allowed by the TFEU. 
Reverse Discrimination
The discrimination in most cases do not fall within the EU 
competence, because of so called ‘internal’ situation is re-
verse discrimination, where for example: “national work-
ers cannot claim rights in their own Member State, which 
workers, who are national of the other Member States could 
claim there” (Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, p.720). In Saud-
ers25  ECJ concluded since there is no connecting factor of 
the national worker to situations covered by the EU Law, she 
should not rely on protection provided in the Article 45 of the 
TFEU (ex. Article 39 TEC), and hence is excluded from its 
regulation (Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, p.720). 
Summarizing “the Court located the objectives of the Ar-
ticle 45 of the TFEU (ex. Article 39 TEC) firmly within the am-
bit of the provision’s, more predominant themes – movement 
and the protection of migrant, not home workers” (Niamh 
Nic Shuibhne, 2002,p.734). The wholly internal rule applies 
to goods as well. The typical example of reverse discrimi-
nation, here is a case of Mathot26. According to this case, 
Belgian producers were required to indicate their name and 
address on the butter packages, while importers were not 
required to do so.  Belgian entrepreneurs argued that it was 
contrary to the Article 34 of the TFEU. However, court held 
that such kind of discrimination was not falling within the 
competence of the EU law (Chris Hilson, 1999, pp.459-460). 
The difference in this case between goods and persons that 
internal rule applies “…in the sense that intra-Community 
trade must be at issue before the relevant Treaty provisions 
will bite” (Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 2002, p.738).
It might be worth to think where this type of discrimina-
tion comes from? Do Member States establish less favor-
able regime for their citizens in the first place or was it a 
result from ultimate community protection of the persons 
moving from one Member State to another? According to 
Cannizzaro, reverse discrimination is a consequence of the 
existing overlapping competencies derived from the diffe-
rent objectives and values of the different legal systems so 
it should be analyzed based on domestic principle of equal 
treatment since reverse discrimination always occurs within 
the Member State (Enzo Cannizaro, 1997, pp.29-30). 
However, not-withstanding factors causing ‘reverse discri-
mination’, material difference in treatment remains and if 
this is recognized as a problem, the responsibility of its 
resolution should be taken by the EU (Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 
2002, p.738).
The circle of exclusively internal situations for persons 
as not falling within the scope of the EU Law and hence not 
subject to its regulation was narrowed by the case law. For 
example in Terhoeve27  it was established that worker will 
be able to use advantages envisaged in the Article 45 of the 
TFEU (ex. Article 39 TEC) against his/her own state, if the 
worker has been employed or resided in other member state 
(Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, p.720). This notion is 
enhanced by the concept of the EU citizenship. “The intro-
duction of citizenship generalized for the benefit of all citi-
zens, the right to enter and the right to reside in the territory 
of another Member State” (Craig P., De Burca G.,2002, 
p.761). However, in order to enjoy the benefits of the citi-
zenship, first, person should have nationality of the Mem-
ber State and secondly, the presence of essential element 
for EU regulation – actual movement of the person is still 
required (Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 2002,p.749). Shuibhne em-
phasized: “It is not so much that movement is problematic 
or redundant as a criterion in itself; it is more that the 
profound extent to which EU law can now bear on a 
person’s life seems increasingly to devalue movement as a 
precondition for these advantages to adhere in the first 
place” (Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 2002, p.732). In Martinez de 
Sala28 and Grzelczyk29 rights to enjoy the same social 
benefits as citizens of the host state were derived from the 
EU citizenship of the migrant persons (Niamh Nic Shuib-
hne, 2002,p.750). In Baumbast30  Court put this view even 
further directly applying right of the residence in another 
Member State other than home country without reference 
to one of the EU freedoms and concluded:
22 Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland, [1982]ECR 4005
23 Case 207/83, Commission v. United Kingdom [1985] ECR 1201 
24 Case 50/85, Schloh v.Auto Controle Technique [1986] ECR 1855
25 Case 175/78, R. v  Sauders [1979] ECR 1129
26 Case 98/86 Ministere Public v. Mathot [1987] ECR 809
27 Case 18/95, F.C.Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulieren/Ondernemingen Buitenland [1999] ECR I-345
28 Case 85/96 Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691
29 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide Sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Nauve [2001] ECR I-6193
30 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Judgement of 17 September, 2002
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“…a citizen of the European Union who no longer en-
joys a right of residence as a migrant worker in the Host 
Member State can, as a citizen of the Union, enjoy there a 
right of residence by direct application of the Article 18(1) EC 31. 
The exercise of that right  is subject to the limitations and condi-
tions referred to in that provision, but the competent authori-
ties and, where necessary, the national courts  must ensure 
that those limitations and conditions are applied in compli-
ance with the general principles of the Community Law, and 
in particular, the principle of proportionality.”32 
Besides, it was considered that cross border element, 
as a precondition should be real and not potential or hypo-
thetical (Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 2002, p.736). However, Car-
penter33  case exemplified the contrary. The Court held that:
“…the Community legislature has recognized the impor-
tance of ensuring the protection of the family life of nation-
als of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to 
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the 
Treaty, as I particular apparent from the provisions of the 
Council regulations and directives on the freedom of em-
ployed and self-employed workers within the Community….
It is clear that the separation of Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter 
would be detrimental to their family life and therefore, to the 
conditions under which Mr. Carpenter exercises a funda-
mental freedom. That freedom could not be fully effective 
if Mr. Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by 
obstacles raised in his country of origin to the entry and resi-
dence of his spouse.”34 
Two major points should be made based on this case. 
First, despite that Mr. Carpenter actually did not leave his 
country of origin; he was still covered by protection of EU law 
since he was considered as a provider of cross-border ser-
vices. It should be noted that, in such circumstances cross 
border element might not be always real. Secondly, potential 
obstacle (‘family situation’) to exercise EU freedoms was ac-
cepted and regarded by the court as a hindering free move-
ment of persons and that Mr. Carpenter was deterred from 
exercising his fundamental rights. As a consequence, this 
situation might lead to the EU citizenship loosing element 
of cross border movement and hence imposing broader 
characteristics to its concept.
Exemptions Established by the EU Law
Member States within the regulatory powers establish res-
trictions on the free trade necessary in the public interest. 
However, regulations can fail to pursue public interest be-
cause of the political lobbing of the private interests other 
than public or in the context of the EU they may act as bar-
riers to the cross border trade (Jukka Snell, 2002, p.171). 
Nevertheless, “interests of free trade cannot automatically 
override the interests protected by the national measure” 
(Jukka Snell, 2002, p.171). According to the case law, it is 
clear that Court tries to achieve the balance between the 
application and the effective implementation of the EU legis-
lation and permitted restrictions. These derogations can be 
based on the Treaty provisions or prevailing interest of the 
general good (Andrea Biondi, 1999/2000, p.470). The let-
ter was developed by the Court of Justice and “it is closely 
related to the court activism in widening the scope of the 
Treaty freedoms from mere non-discrimination principles to 
general prohibitions on all measures, whether discriminatory 
or not, which constitute a restriction on the free movement 
…” (Michael Tison, 1998, p.211).  However, distinctly appli-
cable measures can be justified only based on the Treaty 
provisions (Andrea Biondi, 1999/2000, p.470). In the field 
of goods, According to the Article 36 the TFEU (ex. Article 
30 TEC) discriminatory restrictions on intra-EU trade can be 
allowed to the extent that there is no EU legislation on these 
matters (Paul Bater, 2000, p.9): public morality; public policy; 
public security; protection of the life and health of humans, 
animals or plants; protection of national artistic, historic or 
archeological treasures; and protection of the industrial and 
commercial property.
The similar provisions are provided for free movement 
of services and persons. According to  Article 52 the TFEU 
(ex. Article 46 TEC) and Article 45 the TFEU (ex. Article 39 
TEC) the differentiated treatment of foreign nationals can 
be allowed on the grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health. 
The essence of those derogations is to protect certain 
interests deriving from the sovereignty of the State and other 
core areas important for its functioning and consequently to 
balance free trade against those interests. (Jukka Snell, 
2002, p.172). It is notable, the concept of public policy could 
easily include wide range of issues (Jukka Snell, 2002, 
p.180). However, the Court interpreted that it may “be relied
upon in the event of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat 
to the requirements of the public policy affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society”35. 
As for equally applicable measures, in addition they 
may be justified based on the “principle of ‘overriding public 
interest provided that four conditions are satisfied: they must 
apply in a non-discriminatory manner, they must be justified 
by imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain it” (Andrea Biondi, 1999/2000, 
p.470). Two last conditions of the objective justification com-
prise proportionality test, which entails scrutinizing whether 
the aim could not be achieved by other less harming means 
(Craig P., De Burca G., 2002, p.816). The proportionality is 
31 Article 21 the TFEU (ex. Article 18 TEC)
32 Baumbast paragraph 94
33 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v .Secretary of State for the Home Department, judgment of 11 July, 2002
34 Carpenter, paragraphs 38,39
35 For example: Case C-348/96 Donatella Calfa[1999] ECR I-11, paragraph 21
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regarded as “the condition through which the arbitrage bet-
ween the EU interest and the Member States’ regulatory 
interests is effected” (Michael Tison, 1998, p.224).  In ad-
dition, it should be noted that, proportionality is intended to 
protect interest in rationality making accent on incentives 
and motivations for using proportionality, rather than propor-
tionality inquiry as such (George Bermann, 2002, pp.75-76). 
The principle applied for derogations foreseen by the TFEU, 
is also used for the objective justification, namely: if there is 
the EU legislation in place, Member States are not allowed 
to rely on general good justifications36.  “The burden of proof 
rests with the party that invokes the exception” (Jukka Snell, 
2002, p.186). However, derogation would not be consid-
ered as legitimately justified, if it pursues economic purpose 
(Craig P., De Burca G., 2002, p.816).
The general application of the justification seems to be 
similar for all freedoms, namely: “as long as the measure 
pursues a non-projectionist aim, it can be approved (unless 
it falls foul of the proportionality test)” (Jukka Snell, 2002, 
p.193). However, certain diversity still can be observed.
Hilson concerning this point states that “…adopting a dif-
ferential approach between the freedoms, there is also evi-
dence that the Court applies a differential approach between 
the freedoms: with services, for example, state regulation 
of more important services such as insurance appears to 
be treated more leniently in terms of objective justification 
than “lesser” services such as tourism” (Chris Hilson, 1999, 
p.461).
In Cassis de Dijon Court introduced short list of man-
datory requirements, but by using words “in particular” indi-
cated that it is not exhaustive (Jukka Snell, 2002, p.191). In 
Gouda37  and other subsequent cases Court broadened the 
list of overriding reasons related to public interest, such as 
prevention of fraud, protection of creditors, road safety etc. It 
could be observed that widening of the scope of free move-
ment rules were accompanied by development of the justifi-
cations (Jukka Snell, 2002, p.185). This development can be 
seen as the balance of the guaranteeing free movement and 
preserving legitimate interests of the Member States. Sum-
marizing Snell indicates three major theories on develop-
ment of objective justification: “The first sees them as a rule 
of reason, which does not determine the substantive scope 
of the free movement provisions, but amounts to ‘a recogni-
tion by the Court, on essentially equitable grounds, that cer-
tain interests or values are deserving of judicial protection 
of the EU level pending the intervention of the Community 
legislator’. The second view sees overriding requirements 
as a concrete manifestation of residual competencies left to 
Member States. According to this view, overriding require-
ments determine whether the suspect measure falls within 
the scope of the free movement provisions in the first place. 
The third view sees overriding requirements as a general 
principle of the Community Law protecting the general in-
terest in connection with the achievement of the freedoms” 
(Jukka Snell, 2002, p.194). 
Conclusion
The harmony on free movement and internal market has 
been established based on the positive integration and en-
forcement of fundamental freedoms by the ECJ known as 
“negative integration”. Nowadays less and less issues relat-
ed to free movement are falling within the competencies of 
the Member States. Thus, it is difficult to draw the precise line 
between EU and Member States competencies. From this 
point of view, Cassis de Dijon and Dassonville had signifi-
cant regulatory consequences (Craig P., De Burca G., 2002, 
p.677). In fact the scope of the regulatory competence of the
Member States was substantially reduced and the circle of 
spheres subject to EU intervention was broadened. Thus, 
most of the national measures hindering free movement or 
interstate trade can be caught by the EU Law. However, the 
question raised is: whether centralization through intensive 
judicial intervention or harmonization processes should fur-
ther narrow regulatory powers of the Member States finally 
resulting in their complete deprivation? Based on the analy-
sis conducted in this paper we can conclude that in terms 
of establishing single market Court should keep a burden of 
balancing free trade and free movement against other 
interests using system of justification (Jukka Snell, 2002, 
p.218). Consequently, we do believe that “an ‘area without
frontiers’ requires no less, nor more, than that.”  
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